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Chapter 6
EUROSCEPTICISM IN CROATIA:  
ON THE FAR SIDE OF RATIONALITY?
Aleksandar Štulhofer*
Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Zagreb
Zagreb
ABSTRACT
This paper deals with the characteristics of euroscepticism in 
Croatia, defined as a combination of distrust in the European Union 
and distaste for membership. An analysis of the dynamics of the two 
dimensions shows that initially these two factors did not coincide, but 
that after 2004 they converged. Starting off from a theoretical model 
according to which the attitude to the EU is affected by both utilitarian 
or pragmatic as well as ethnic-cum-nationalist (symbolic) factors, the 
analysis of data collected at the end of 2003 on a probabilistic national 
sample draws attention to the heterogeneous motives behind eurosce-
pticism, which calls into question the effectiveness of any single inter-
vention strategy. Exclusive nationalism and its socio-cultural, political 
and economic premises have been confirmed as an important source of 
euroscepticism. As against symbolic motivations, the impact of utilita-
rian motives on the attitude to the EU turned out to be marginal, but it 
is not clear to what extent this result is the consequence of methodolo-
gical constraints. The data also show that lack of trust in the EU parti-
ally reflects distrust in national institutions. The paper concludes with a 
brief list of recommendations, focused particularly on ways of increa-
sing trust in both national and EU institutions.
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INTRODUCTION
The last five years have seen a marked decline in the desirability 
of joining the EU in Croatian public opinion.i Unlike the views of the 
political elite – that is, most of the political parties, including the two 
biggest – fewer than 50% of Croatian citizens now support EU acces-
sion (Gfk Hrvatska – Omnibus, 2006). This dissipation of enthusiasm 
must be alarming for the Government and the Parliament, who have 
proclaimed entry into the EU the core of the country’s foreign policy 
objectives.ii This is particularly striking if we bear in mind the fact that 
a little more than two years ago, the great majority of Croatian citizens 
shared the views of the politicians. 
A number of press commentaries and analyses have been writ-
ten on the reasons for the reduced support for accession. Although we 
are still waiting for detailed empirical studies, several explanations of 
the dynamics described have been put forward. The reasons range from 
bruised national pride (the issue of the extradition of a suspected ge-
neral to The Hague) and the strengthening of the appropriate symbolic 
resistance, via economic fears (the rise in the price of real estate as a 
result of demand from foreign purchasers, the import of cheaper agri-
cultural products, the obliteration of indigenous products and the like), 
to loss of trust in the whole of the EU project after the shipwreck of 
the European Constitution in France and Holland. Most commentators 
have stated several reasons behind the fall in the support for EU acces-
sion, emphasising the complexity of the situation as well as the questi-
onable success of any attempt to reverse the trend.
In this short paper, I shall attempt to throw light on the growth 
of euroscepticism in Croatian public opinion, analysing particularly the 
dynamics of support for Croatia’s joining the EU, and trust in the EU. 
Although it handles an issue that has already received a fair share of 
debate, the advantage of the paper is in its use of empirical analyses 
founded on a nationally representative dataset. On the other hand, it is 
precisely here that the shortcoming of the proposed analyses inheres. 
Unfortunately, the research study (South East European Social Survey 
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Project; SEESSP-A and SEESSP-B) was not designed to measure, or 
test out public opinions to do with the EU.iii From this point of view, 
the indicators that are available are anything but ideal.
The first part offers a definition of euroscepticism and sets forth 
the current state of knowledge concerning the symbolic and material 
interests that affect its dynamics. In the second part I outline the dyna-
mics of two basic dimensions of euroscepticism in Croatia; the rise in 
the disinclination to joining and the relative stability of the lack of trust 
in the EU. The lack of association between the two dimensions in the 
period prior to 2004 is discussed, as well its occurrence in 2004. The 
third section is devoted to an analysis of the social-demographic pro-
file of local eurosceptics, and to testing the relative influence of sym-
bolic and materialistic factors on the basic dimensions of euroscepti-
cism. The last, fourth, part puts forward a debate that places the fin-
dings in the context of the debate on the rational (pragmatic) and irra-
tional (symbolic) bases of euroscepticism in general. The paper ends 
with a brief list of recommendations founded upon the results of the 
analyses carried out with the aim of increasing trust in national and Eu-
ropean Union institutions.
EUROSCEPTICISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE
As mentioned, this paper does not investigate the euroscepti-
cism of the political elites. For this reason I use the expression popular 
euroscepticism throughout the rest of the paper to describe the degree 
to which members of the public in Croatia express the lack of trust in 
the EU and/or their disinclination to join the Union.iv Popular eurosce-
pticism, in other words, can be either more theoretical (the utterance of 
lack of trust) or practical (the disinclination to accede) and it can vary 
in degrees, with radical euroscepticism being marked by a high degree 
of distrust in the EU as well as unconditional opposition to Croatian ac-
cession. 
Although it might seem at first glance that these dimensions of 
popular euroscepticism are almost identical, it should be noted that so-
meone might have trust in a given institution and yet still be of the 
opinion that it is better for him or her to stay out.v This has, for exam-
ple, been to date the majority viewpoint in Norwegian public opinion. 
A similar situation can be found in the case of the opposition of most 
Swedes to replacing their national currency by the Euro. The differen-
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ce between the wish to accede and trust is clearly contoured in a case 
when they are marked by a cause-and-effect relationship. After the fall 
of communism, in the countries of Central Europe there was very qu-
ickly a highly marked desire for EU accession that, irrespective of the 
lack of information, resulted in emphatic trust in the EU. On the ot-
her hand, precisely the opposite relationship is also possible. If Norw-
ay and Switzerland ever join the EU, the readiness of their citizens for 
their countries to accede will necessarily reflect widespread trust in the 
effectiveness of the Union’s institutions.
Research to date into euroscepticism in the post-communist co-
untries of Central, Eastern and South Eastern Europe has concentrated 
on two aspects: (i) the connection of the phenomenon with party dyna-
mics and (ii) non-party causes of popular euroscepticism. This appro-
ach is well illustrated by the frequently quoted works of Taggart and 
Szczerbiak (2002; 2004), who claim that the euroscepticism to be seen 
in all the post-transitional countries (except, perhaps, for Bulgaria) is 
the consequence of the opposition’s confrontation with the Europhile 
parties in power (Sitter, 2001). Because of the relative marginality of 
parties that stand for hard-line euroscepticism, party-induced popular 
euroscepticism should be of a quite limited extent. Although most euro-
sceptic or indeed Europhobic parties belong to the right, within which 
the process of European integration is criticised with the rhetoric of 
nationalism, sometimes they can be found on the left as well (Evans, 
2000). Here the attack on the EU seems to be based on a critique of 
neo-liberalism and globalising capitalism. 
Research focused on the viewpoints and values of public opinion 
very often discuss the influence of symbolic (cultural, identity-related) 
and materialistic (economically rational) factors in euroscepticism.vi
The authors, in other words, endeavour to quantify the relative contri-
bution of these two dimensions to the negative attitude of the public 
vis-à-vis the EU. The impact of what is usually called exclusive nati-
onal identity on popular euroscepticism has been borne out in several 
studies (Care, 2002; McLaren, 2002; Hooghe and Marks, 2004).vii Wit-
hin this value pattern, the integration, multiculturalism and cosmopoli-
tanism that EU-isation embodies are considered a threat to the national 
culture and indigenous traditions. Resistance to the EU is thus percei-
ved as an act of patriotism. 
The analyses also throw light on the powerful influence of eco-
nomic rationalism, that is, the importance of pragmatic calculation of 
the costs and benefits of accession (Hooghe and Marks, 2004; McLa-
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ren, 2002; Tucker et al., 2002).viii Both the macro and the micro dimen-
sion are at issue here. In the first case, popular euroscepticism will de-
pend on the success of the country during transition. As suggested by 
Linden and Pohlman (2003), countries that have successfully carried 
out the transition will have less benefit from joining than countries that 
are still grappling with the transitional processes. The Czechs, hence, 
necessarily showed less enthusiasm for joining the EU than, for exam-
ple, the Romanians today (Linden and Pohlman, 2003:328).ix Differen-
ces in success at the macro level can work in another way as well. Sin-
ce the economic benefits of joining are smaller in successful transition 
countries, the weakening of economic interests in such countries could 
well affect the increase in the perception of the symbolic costs (fear of 
loss of identity, for example).
At the micro level, inside both successful and less successful 
transition countries, the affinity for euroscepticism tends to depend on 
personal perception of the costs and benefits of joining. Somewhat sim-
plified, the greater the human resources that the individual can deploy 
(education, skills, age, professional status, income) the greater are the 
potential benefits from European integration and the smaller the likeli-
hood of euroscepticism. Empirical research has provided some support 
for these hypotheses, showing that popular euroscepticism is mainly a 
marker of transitional losers (Szczerbiak, 2001; McLaren, 2002; Jacobs 
and Pollack, 2004; Tucker et al., 2002).
EUROSCEPTICISM IN CROATIA
The proposed working definition of popular euroscepticism 
brings out two basic dimensions: disinclination to join the EU and di-
strust in the EU. The first of these, the point of view that rejects Croati-
an joining in European integration, has in the last two years been much 
more widespread than in the earlier period. As Figure 1 shows, unw-
illingness to join was until the very end of 2003 quite marginal (up to 
20%). During 2004 a dramatic growth ensued (to about 40%), which, 
though with considerably diminished dynamics, went on in 2005. In 
the last year, the number of those who were opposed to Croatia joining 
the EU was more or less the same as the number of those who expres-
sed the opposite viewpoint.
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Figure 1  Dynamics of attitudes concerning accession to the European Union, 
Croatia 2000-2005
* Source: Gfk Croatia − Omnibus, 2006
Unlike the first, the second dimension of popular euroscepti-
cism, lack of trust in the EU, is not regularly measured. Still, an overvi-
ew of the existing studies carried out on probabilistic national samples 
provides at least a rough picture of the dynamics of lack of trust in the 
EU in the last ten years (Table 1). Unlike the dynamics of attitudes to-
ward accession, distrust in the EU is relatively stable during the period. 
On average, distrust of the EU was felt by 54% of the population.x
Contrary to expectations, the dynamics of the two dimensions 
of popular euroscepticism do not overlap. How are we to explain their 
different dynamics up to 2004? Since they show greater instability, it 
should be hypothesised that the attitudes toward joining the EU are 
more affected by situational factors than is the case with the dynamics 
of trust in the EU. It is also plausible that respondents may think the 
EU is generally a good idea, but not necessarily for their country. The-
oretically, then, a situation in which there is a relatively high degree of 
trust in the EU and a relatively low level of willingness to join need not 
be unusual. The problem though is that up to 2004, exactly the opposi-
te situation was present in Croatia: the desire to join the EU (80% for) 
was widespread in spite of the relatively low degree of trust in the Uni-
on (34%).xi 
Bearing in mind the low level of information about the EU 
among the members of the public during the nineties, it seems reasona-
ble to assume that the majority support for the accession of Croatia to 
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the EU was based on motives typical of the initial reactions of transitio-
nal societies to European integration (Malova and Haughton, 2002).  
Table 1 Trust in the European Union, Croatia 1995-2005 (%)*
WVS a
1995
EVSb
1999
SEESSP-Ac
2003
EB-62d
2004
EB-63d
spring
2005
EB-64d
autumn
2005
Yes 32 38 31 42 28 35
No 57 54 58 43 58 52
Don’t know 12 8 11 16 14 12
*  No precise comparison between the 1995-2003 and 2004-2005 periods is possible. 
Up to 2004, trust in the EU was measured on a scale of one to ﬁve (“a great deal of
trust”, “quite a lot”, “not very much”, “none at all” and “I don’t know”), and in 
the Eurobarometer research (2004 and 2005) only two categories of answer to the 
same question were provided: “I am inclined towards trust”, “I am inclined towards 
distrust”. The data collected in the 1995-2003 period were recoded so that “a great 
deal” and “quite a lot” were taken to denote trust, while “not very much” and “none 
at all” denote distrust in the EU.
a   World Value Survey – Croatia (Erasmus gilda, Zagreb; N = 1196)
b   European Value Survey – Croatia (Catholic Theology Faculty, Zagreb; N = 1103)
c   Southeast European Social Survey Project (international consortium; N = 1250)
d   Eurobarometer Research (Eurobarometer, 2004; 2005a; 2005b; N = 1000)
This is on the whole a desire to show that they belong to Euro-
pe, both in a cultural sense and in terms of political compatibility, and 
a belief that becoming a member of the EU will result in a rapid incre-
ase in the standard of living. When the negotiation process started, this 
naïve idealism dissolved fairly rapidly in the countries that recently be-
came EU members. A similar process, it would seem, has been at work 
in Croatia in the last few years. As shown by the most recent public 
opinion survey carried out in Croatia, Romania and Bulgaria by the Au-
strian Paul Lazarsfeld Institute, most citizens of Croatia do not believe 
that entry into the EU will result in a diminution of corruption in the 
country or in a rise in wages. On the other hand, more than 90% of re-
spondents thought that joining the EU would result in a price rise (Ian-
cu, 2006).
If, then, the earlier inclination towards joining can be understood 
in terms of a need for the legitimation of the Croatian state (and its 
post-communist political and socio-cultural achievements) – which 
was unaffected by relatively low levels of trust in the EU – it is very li-
kely that different reasons are behind the current convergence between 
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disinclination to join and distrust in the EU.xii Furthermore, the stability 
of popular euroscepticism in the last two years suggests that eurosce-
pticism is today a coherent socio-political option with relatively stable 
motives. 
THE BOUNDED RATIONALITY  
OF CROATIAN EUROSCEPTICISM?
The claim that from 2004 onwards euroscepticism is a cohe-
rent social and political option that could be marked by relatively stable 
symbolic and materialistic interests needs to be verified empirically. 
The used data (SEESSP) were collected in December 2003, and mark 
the transition between the period in which the two dimensions of po-
pular euroscepticism were disparate (1995-2003) and the later period, 
marked by convergence.
With this objective, in the rest of the paper I present two analy-
ses. The first attempts to draw the social and demographic profile of di-
sinclination of joining and lack of trust in the EU. Bearing in mind re-
cent findings suggesting that euroscepticism is more prevalent among 
the transitional losers (McLaren, 2002; Jacobs and Pollack, 2004; 
Tucker et al., 2002) it can be expected that age, education, income and 
occupational status will be important determinants of popular eurosce-
pticism in Croatia.
The findings presented in Table 2 suggest that there is no clear 
socio-demographic profile of Croatian eurosceptics. Although the ana-
lysis does show that the older and lesser educated respondents are more 
inclined to say no to accession, the effect of both variables is weak. In 
case of trust in the EU, none of the demographic and socioeconomic in-
dicators has proved a significant predictor. In contrast to expectations, 
the analysis suggests that popular euroscepticism is determined neit-
her by human capital nor by personal success, or the lack of it, during 
the transitional years. Does this mean that the perception of the EU 
in Croatia is based on purely irrational motives and bizarre situational 
effects?xiii
149
Table 2  The socio-demographic proﬁle of attitudes toward the accession and
trust in the European Union* 
SEESSP-B
(N = 802)a
Accession to the EU b
SEESSP-A
(N = 793)a
Trust in the EU
Beta (p<)c
Gender  0.02 (n.s.)  -0.01 (n.s.)
Age  -0.10 (0.05)  0.07 (n.s.)
Education  -0.10 (0.05)  0.02 (n.s)
Occupational statusd  0.02 (n.s.)  0.04 (n.s.)
Household income  -0.04 (n.s.)  0.08 (n.s.)
Size of domicile  -0.01 (n.s.)  -0.05 (n.s.)
* Multiple (linear) regression analysis
a  This concerns the statement “Croatia should join the EU”, to which respondents 
replied on a scale of 1 (I do not agree at all) to 5 (I wholeheartedly agree)
b This concerns separate SEESSP samples, each of which covered 1,250 subjects
c  n.s. – association is not statistically signiﬁcant
d  The variable was dichotomised, in such a way that 1 denotes occupations requiring 
some level of expertise and 0 denotes all other occupations
The impossibility of identifying Croatian eurosceptics suggests 
either certain fluidity or a micro-diversity of motives, but the issue is 
whether they can be considered irrational. If we should characterise po-
pular euroscepticism in Croatia as irrational, this would imply that the 
eurosceptics have no materialistic expectations from European integra-
tion. If citizens form their expectations of the EU on the basis of their 
experience with national institutions, such expectations are not irrati-
onal, but, rather, boundedly rational. In this case, bounded rationali-
ty describes the indirect but personally (and materially) relevant per-
ception of the EU. Put more simply, when we cannot evaluate the EU 
institutions on the grounds of our own experience (which the citizens 
of a non-member country cannot have), but use proxies – assessing lo-
cal or national institutions – such a procedure can not be termed irra-
tional. This is the so called proxy mechanism, elaborated in the well 
known paper by Anderson (1998). Anderson claims that in the absen-
ce of information about the EU institutions, citizens will have to make 
their assessment on the basis of their experience with local or national 
institutions.xiv
The findings in Table 3 provide some empirical arguments for 
the irrationality vs. (bounded) rationality debate regarding the motives 
for trust or lack of trust in the EU. The analysis included seven po-
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tential correlates of trust in the EU. The first two, trust in the national 
government and the legal system, are indicators of Anderson’s proxy 
mechanism. Occupational status and social self-positioning are indi-
cators of utilitarian motives, pointing to the cost-benefit assessment 
of the EU.xv Political self-positioning is an indicator of compatibili-
ty of political values, with the existing literature predicting associati-
on between right-wing political positioning and lack of trust in the EU 
(Carey, 2002; McLaren, 2002). The last two indicators, the index of na-
tional exclusivity and membership in cultural and art associations, me-
asure the presence of symbolic motives. While the first variable repre-
sents the impossibility of establishing complete trust between different 
ethnic and national groups, the second indicator reflects loyalty to (and 
personal importance of) ethnic and national culture.xvi 
Table 3 Predictors of trust in the European Union
             SEESSP-A (N = 624)
Beta (p<)a
Trust in the legal system  0.10 (0.05)
Trust in the government  0.40 (0.001)
Occupational status  -0.06 (n.s.)
Social self-positioning (top-bottom)  -0.05 (n.s.)
Political self-positioning (left-right)  -0.12  (0.01)
Index of national exclusivityb  -0.11 (0.01)
Membership in culture and art associations  0.01 (n.s.)
R2  0.22
a   n.s. – association is not statistically signiﬁcant
b   The index is composed of the following  four statements: “Ethnically mixed marriages 
are always more unstable than others”; “A man can feel completely safe only if he lives 
in a community in which his/her own ethnic group constitutes the majority”; “Among 
various peoples cooperation can be achieved, but never absolute trust”; “In the choice 
of a marriage partner, ethnicity should be one of the most important factors”. The index 
has excellent reliability (Alpha = 0.86)
The findings point to a coexistence between symbolic and boun-
dedly rational motives. The correlation between trust in national insti-
tutions and trust in the EU confirms Anderson’s proposition (Anderson, 
1998; Rimac and Štulhofer, 2004). On the other hand, negative associ-
ation of right-wing political self-positioning and exclusive nationalism 
with trust in the EU lends cogency to the proposition concerning the 
impact of symbolic factors.
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THE STRUCTURE OF CROATIAN 
EUROSCEPTICISM
The analysis of the factors that affect trust or lack of it in the EU 
drew attention to the importance of two processes. The first is asses-
sment-making on the basis of the proxy mechanism, concerning which 
there will be more below. The second process is the influence of sym-
bolic values on the attitudes toward the EU, the findings indicating the 
central role of exclusive nationalism.xvii The association between the 
exclusive variant of the nationalistic worldview and popular eurosce-
pticism seems to a great extent self-evident. But in this way it would be 
easy to underrate the complexity of their relationship, which exceeds 
mere disdain of multiculturalism and resistance to the supranational 
processes (Vukman, 2004). The symbolic foundations of popular eu-
roscepticism include socio-cultural, political and, somewhat more sel-
dom in evidence, economic convictions (McLaren, 2002).xviii 
As for the socio-cultural dimension, exclusive nationalism bla-
mes European integration for the fragmentation of the national identity 
and the attack on traditional communal values, particularly their reli-
gious foundations − all in the name of contemporary liberal individua-
lism. Also, the integration processes are often perceived as an insult to 
the national pride (the “conditions” imposed for accession), which indi-
rectly contributes to the destruction of the collective identity and natio-
nal values. The political aspect is particularly visible in the concern for 
the loss of national sovereignty, and the claimed inherently fraught po-
sition of small countries within the EU decision-making processes. Alt-
hough less often present, economic ideas are no less important an ele-
ment of exclusive nationalism. In general, these consist of various ty-
pes of criticisms of global, neoliberal capitalism, which is held respon-
sible for the demise of corporate social organisation and related welfare 
of the people. At the level of everyday practice, exclusive nationalism 
is quite often at odds with the ultimate consequences of the free mar-
ket that European integration takes as its point of departure, for it sees 
them as a threat to domestic production.
The predominance of symbolic over utilitarian motives in the 
attitudes toward the EU in Croatia should be viewed with caution. Alt-
hough the authors of a recent paper concluded that nationalism is a 
more powerful predictor of support to European integration than eco-
nomic rationality (Hooghe and Marks, 2004:3), the marginal impact of 
utilitarian motivations on the Croatian public assessment of the EU co-
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uld also be the consequence of methodological shortcomings, such as 
the absence of quality indicators (a list of personal expectations from 
EU accession). This limitation does not call into question the importan-
ce of exclusive nationalism, but it warns that it would be a mistake to 
conclude, on the basis of the presented analyses, that utilitarian (mate-
rialistic) motivations are completely irrelevant for the dynamics of po-
pular euroscepticism. The impact of utilitarian motives remains to be 
investigated (see Bagić and Šalinović, 2006).
Analyses shown in the previous chapter confirmed the existen-
ce of the proxy mechanism (Anderson, 1998), a specific cognitive stra-
tegy through which respondents evaluate institutions the workings of 
which they are insufficiently informed about on the basis of their as-
sessment of institutions that they do have experience with. This, accor-
ding to the findings, relates particularly to trust in the national gover-
nment, which has turned out to be the most powerful predictor of trust 
in the EU. Although the proxy assessment is not an irrational procedu-
re, its results can be highly problematic, not the least since trust in na-
tional institutions can be based on the general perception of corruption 
in society rather than on concrete evidence about the functioning of the 
institutions in question (Štulhofer, 2004; Rimac and Štulhofer, 2004; 
Štulhofer, 2001).
The use of the proxy mechanism does not depend only on ava-
ilability of information about the EU. In countries with low levels of 
participation and/or widespread disbelief that citizens can have any in-
fluence on the making of political decisions this mechanism might have 
a practical purpose, particularly as justification for apathy and opting-
out. The assumption that derives from this is that the success of in-
formation campaigns, the objective of which is to increase knowledge 
about the EU, will depend on the reputation of national institutions as-
sociated with the campaigns.
As already point out, the empirical analyses presented in this 
work suffer from some serious methodological limitations. The first 
relates to the instruments used. The fact that SEESSP questionnaires 
were not designed to explore views about the EU, but were intended to 
measure a broad range of social attitudes and values, has as its conseq-
uence a highly limited choice of relevant variables. Each of the questi-
onnaires entailed a single indicator of attitudes towards the EU – trust 
in the EU in SEESSP-A and views about the accession in SEESSP-B. 
Questions concerning the understanding of the institutional structure 
and manner of working of the EU, personal expectations from Croatia’s 
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joining the EU or reasons for (dis)trust in the EU were not covered by 
the questionnaire.
Another limitation is the timing of the SEESSP field work. Data 
collection started at the end of 2003, just before the parliamentary ele-
ctions. Although it is not entirely clear in which direction the pre-ele-
ction mood might have systematically biased the results, it is likely that 
various situational factors are embedded in the dataset. In itself, this is 
not a problem as long as it is possible to quantify (and control for) these 
situational effects. In the SEESSP study this was not the case.
The final limitation is related to the dynamics of attitudes tow-
ard joining the EU, that is, to the fact that the SEESSP data were col-
lected at the time point that immediately preceded the period characte-
rized by a sudden disappearance of the majority support for Croatian 
membership in the EU (Figure 1). Since the change happened in the 
first half of 2004, it is plausible that the end of 2003 (the time when the 
SEESSP field work took place) was in a certain sense a period of tran-
sformation.xix Following this logic, the SEESSP dataset could contain 
only indications of the change of attitudes toward the EU, but not com-
pletely clear and coherently formed (new) viewpoints.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Put briefly, the analyses presented suggest the following:
•  Several factors affect the dynamics of euroscepticism. It would seem 
that various social groups, the members of which do not necessarily 
share the same or similar social positions, state various motives for a 
negative perception of the EU. If so, it would be a mistake to believe 
in any single successful strategy for the reduction of euroscepticism.
•  Exclusive nationalism and its socio-cultural, political and economic 
premises are an important source of popular euroscepticism. In com-
parison with these symbolic motives, the influence of utilitarian mo-
tives on the attitude to the EU has turned out to be marginal, although 
it is not clear to what extent this could have been the consequence of 
the methodological shortcomings.
•  Some of the dynamics of popular euroscepticism are determined by 
situational influences, which are often generated by the tactical (po-
lemical) use of the idea of European integration in party competition, 
which is then picked up by mass media.
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•  Trust in the EU is formed partly through trust in national institutions. 
The reputation of the EU, an institution of which citizens of non-EU 
countries are less knowledgeable of, is at least partially a reflection 
of the reputation of the national government, the parliament and legal 
system.
From these conclusions a short list of recommendations could 
be composed. Their main aim is to contribute to a reduction in popular 
euroscepticism, particularly through increasing (better-informed) trust 
in the EU. It could well be that increasing citizens’ trust in institutions 
is a public good in itself, irrespective of the speed and ultimate out-
come of the processes of European integration (Uslaner and Badescu, 
2004).xx
Recommendation 1: Continued provision of information about the 
European Union, the integration processes and the course of the 
negotiations
As the experience of the new European ten indicates, acceptan-
ce of the EU idea and trust in its institutions are inseparable from the 
ongoing process of informing citizens about the pertaining symbo-
lic and material benefits, as well as about certain costs of integration 
(Vetik, 2003; Rulikova, 2004). As a project that was created from the 
top, through the agreement of political elites, the EU has always inclu-
ded the risk of the absence (or evaporation) of public support. This pu-
blic opinion-related vulnerability was clearly shown in the recent Eu-
ropean Constitution referenda, which resulted in debates about slowing 
down further enlargement, the aim being to restore public trust in the 
very idea of the EU. 
Data concerning the degree to which Croatian citizens are in-
formed about the EU are relatively meagre. Eurobarometer research 
would suggest that Croatian citizens systematically overestimate their 
knowledge about the EU (Eurobarometer, 2004; 2005a; 2005b), which, 
as a potential obstacle, should certainly be taken into account in the 
drawing up of the strategy of a systematic information campaign.xxi A 
substantial rise in the understanding and the knowledge of the EU in 
Croatia requires continuous dissemination of information rather than a 
new campaign. Bearing in mind the likelihood that the negotiation pro-
cess will additionally strengthen popular euroscepticism, as suggested 
by the experience of the ten new members of the EU, systematic infor-
mation dissemination will not only have to be better designed and plan-
ned, but also efficiently and vigorously executed. According to the fin-
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dings presented in this paper, it will be necessary to diversify content, 
approaches and messages to address the various fears, dilemmas and 
prejudices. Efficient implementation of systematic information disse-
mination will require a core of high-quality journalists who will specia-
lize in reporting on the EU related issues.
Recommendation 2: Implementation of measures that increase trust in 
national institutions
This is an activity of exceptional importance, as the Government 
acknowledged, at least in principle, in the recent presentation of the 
proposal of the National Plan for Combating Corruption, 2006-2008. 
According to the existing research (Štulhofer, 2001; 2004; Rothstein, 
2003; Uslaner and Badescu, 2004) citizens’ trust in national institutions 
is strongly correlated with the perception of corruption among civil ser-
vants. Measures that increase professionalism, effectiveness and tran-
sparency, measures that clearly identify responsibilities and entail con-
crete sanctions against the government employees who break the laws 
and rules of professional conduct are an important part of the strategy 
of reducing euroscepticism. An increase in trust in the national institu-
tions should result in a reduction of distrust in the EU institutions and 
may even encourage utilitarian stance toward the integration processes 
– for better or worse.xxii
Recommendation 3: Creating counterbalance to exclusive nationalism
The relationship between the symbolic and the utilitarian expe-
ctations from the EU depends on a number of structural and situational 
factors. In brief, the current domination of the first cannot be dismis-
sed as the fleeting outcome of political and/or media manipulations. 
Strengthening rational attitudes toward the EU is dependent on the suc-
cess of the government in creating the conditions for utilitarian asses-
sment of the accession to the EU. This has at least partially been touc-
hed on in both of the previous recommendations. It is almost trivial to 
remind the reader that the implementation of structural reforms, aimed 
at increasing competitiveness of the Croatian economy, restructuring 
social services and improving the local and national governance, are 
key steps in this direction. It is less inconsequential to stress the need 
for a new national cultural policy, which will encourage an open under-
standing of national identity, the one that is essentially unfinished (un-
closed) and continuously “under construction” (Katunarić et al., 2001). 
Exclusive nationalism feeds on a rather mythical concept of traditional 
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culture and on the idea of a fixed (somehow given) ethnic-cum-national 
identity, which any changes and influences from abroad will necessary 
threaten. This kind of anti-modern, essentially xenophobic and chroni-
cally frustrated and “besieged” vision of national culture and identity 
can be found in other European societies as well, but its scope is on the 
whole marginal. To marginalise such a position in Croatia would assu-
me redefining the historical and literary canons represented in the nati-
onal curriculum during the last 15 years, as well as strategic promotion 
of an open (“not yet completed”) concept of the national culture that re-
places exclusive nationalism with an enlightened patriotism.
*  The author would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their comments and 
suggestions.
i  To a small extent, this paper is based on the address Trust in the EU: Croatian 
1995-2003 (Štulhofer, A., Landripet, I. and Rimac, I.), prepared for the UACES 35th 
Annual Conference and 10th Research Conference “The European Union: Past and 
Future Enlargements”, Zagreb, September 5-7, 2005. 
ii  Although a waning of enthusiasm for EU entry was recorded in most post-transitional 
CE countries that recently became EU member states, this negative trend was related 
to the negotiation process (Jacobs and Pollack, 2004:5). In Croatia it has preceded 
the negotiations, which means that the negotiation process could have an additional 
negative effect of the perceived desirability of the EU.
iii  Because of it large initial size, the SEESSP questionnaire, which was designed to 
measure a wide range of social attitudes and values, was divided into two separate 
surveys (SEESSP-A and SEESSP-B). They were carried out simultaneously on 
probabilistic nationally representative samples, each including 1,250 respondents. 
Only a portion of questions were asked in both surveys. Unfortunately, the indicators 
of attitudes toward the EU were not among these core questions. Trust in the EU was 
included in SEESSP-A and the attitude toward Croatia joining the EU in SEESP-B. 
iv  This deﬁnition differs from the frequently used one according to which Euroscepticism
is a well-founded or unfounded opposition to the process of European integration 
(Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2002:27). The difference between the two lies primarily in 
the degree to which they can be operationalised.
v  It is also possible to imagine a viewpoint in which European integration is good for 
a large but not for a small country.
vi  The same terminology was applied in a recent analysis of European identity (cf. 
Giannakopoulos, 2004).
vii  Unlike inclusive national identiﬁcation, exclusive nationalism is marked by distrust
and social distance toward other ethnic or racial groups (Carey, 2002).
viii  For a more detailed debate of the range of potential costs and beneﬁts of joining the
EU, see Samardžija [et al.] (2000) and Malova and Haughton (2002).
ix  Another research study pointed that the highest scores on the composite index of 
trust in the EU were recorded in Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey, and the lowest in 
the Czech Republic and Slovenia (Gfk Gral-Iteo, 2002).
x  In 1995-2005 period distrust means “a little” trust in the EU or “none at all”.
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xi  The explanation, it is worth observing, cannot be sought in the amount of information 
about the EU, because it is on the rise (Gfk Croatia – Omnibus, 2006).
xii  The relatively low level of trust in the EU during the nineties might be the consequence 
of the disappointment with the way it handled the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.
xiii  A good example is a recent public campaign that warned Croatian citizens that the 
accession to the EU would end the production of the much-vaunted locally produced 
cottage cheese and sour cream.
xiv  It should be observed that such a procedure, irrespective of the outcome, is not 
irrational as long as there is a systematic shortage of reliable information on how 
the EU works and what it is about.
xv  Social position was measured by respondents’ estimations of their position on the 
social hierarchy scale where 1 means the bottom and 10 the top.
xvi  For adherents of exclusive nationalism the EU is a multicultural and transnational 
entity that threatens cultural identity of smaller nations. The deﬁnition of exclusive
nationalism assumes the existence of the inclusive variation, which is sometimes 
simply called patriotism.
xvii  The ﬁnding was partially corroborated by a recently published study. Using data
collected on another probabilistic national sample, the authors reported on the 
negative impact of general national pride on the desirability of European integration 
(Lamza Posavec [et al.], 2006). When the components that constitute the scale of 
general national pride are considered, four of the ﬁve variables denote exclusive
nationalism (Lamza Posavec [et al.], 1006:145).
xviii  Another regression analysis (not presented in the paper) has revealed a clear socio-
demographic proﬁle of a propensity for exclusive nationalism. The predictors are
age (p<0.01), education (p<0.05), income (p<0.05) and the degree of urbanisation 
of the domicile (p<0.001). Exclusive nationalism is overrepresented among older, 
less educated, less economically well-off and less urbanized respondents. 
xix  Also indicated by the Puls Crobarometer data (Bagić and Šalinović, 2006).
xx  Particularly in the light of the beginning of negotiations with the EU and their 
impact on institutional evolution (cf. Malova and Haughton, 2002).
xxi  In both 2004 and 2005 Croatian citizens provided higher estimates of their knowledge 
about the EU than the EU citizens. In sharp contrast to this self-assessment, the 
results of the Eurobarometer knowledge quiz show that Croatian citizens are less 
knowledgeable than their EU counterparts.
xxii  During 1995-2003, trust in national institutions fell sharply (Štulhofer, 2004). In 
1995, the level of trust in national institutions was much lower in Croatia than in 
Slovenia, Austria and Italy (Štulhofer, 2003).
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